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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1764 
___________ 
 
NINA SHAHIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DELAWARE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00475) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 27, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 1, 2016 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2010, Nina Shahin filed two complaints in the District Court against Delaware 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Federal Credit Union (“DFCU”) under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, (“Funds 
Act”), 12 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq., implemented through Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 
(2004).  The actions were later consolidated.  Shahin, a DFCU customer, alleged that in 
May 2010, after she deposited a check into her bank account, DFCU failed to provide her 
with proper notice that an extended hold would be placed on her account, 12 C.F.R. § 
229.13, and timely access to her funds.  In a subsequent amended complaint, Shahin 
alleged claims under “common law principles of ‘principal-agent relationship’ and breach 
of fiduciary duties and the definition of ‘frauds and swindles’ provided in 18 U.S.C. § 
1341.”  In addition to actual damages and costs, Shahin sought $1,000,000 “for court 
fees, loss of time, and damage to her health.” 
 Following discovery, the parties filed motions for summary judgment.  The 
District Court granted partial summary judgment to Shahin after determining that DFCU 
violated 12 C.F.R. § 229.13(e)(2) by assessing overdraft fees under the circumstances 
presented.  The District Court also granted partial summary judgment to DFCU on 
Shahin’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the remaining Funds Act claims.  The Court 
then entered an order directing the parties to file a status report “as to how and what 
schedule this case should proceed.”  In compliance with the judgment, DFCU credited 
Shahin’s bank account in the amount of $66.00, covering the overdraft fees.  
Subsequently, DFCU notified the District Court that it had twice made an offer of 
judgment to Shahin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, in the amount of 
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$1,000, the maximum amount for which it could be liable to Shahin for the notice 
violation.  Based on these offers, on March 7, 2014, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint as moot and entered judgment in favor of Shahin in the amount of $1,000.  The 
District Court retained jurisdiction for a determination as to costs.  The Court ultimately 
re-entered judgment in accordance with its March 7th opinion and order.  Shahin 
appealed. 
  Upon review of Shahin’s arguments on appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s 
decision to: 1) enter judgment for Shahin in the amount of $1,000; 2) deny Shahin’s 
claims for actual damages above $66.00; and 3) dismiss Shahin’s claim for breach of 
fiduciary duties.  See Shahin v. Delaware Federal Credit Union, 602 F. App’x 50, 52-54 
(3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential).  However, we remanded the case in part “for a 
determination as to Shahin’s costs, if any, prior to November 7, 2011.”  Id. at 54. 
 Following remand, and in accordance with our instructions, the District Court 
reviewed whether Shahin was entitled to reimbursement of costs that she might have 
incurred prior to November 7, 2011.  On August 3, 2015, the District Court entered an 
order determining that because Shahin had not incurred any costs prior to November 7, 
2011, she was not entitled to any reimbursement.  Shahin filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration of that order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure.  The District Court denied the motion in a March 11, 2016 order.  This appeal 
followed.1   
 On appeal, Shahin argues that the District Court erred in denying her motion for 
reconsideration of the Court’s August 3, 2015 order (wherein the Court determined that 
Shahin was not entitled to costs).  Although Shahin’s appeal of the denial of her motion 
for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for review,” McAlister v. Sentry 
Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992), Shahin was still required to raise 
arguments in her opening brief with respect to the District Court’s August 3, 2015 order.  
See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because Shahin has not 
done so, any arguments with respect to that order have been waived.2  See Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993); see also LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 
71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that although “appellate courts generally do not 
hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal briefing standards . . . we need not manufacture 
claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se, especially when [she] has raised an 
issue below and elected not to pursue it on appeal.”). 
 We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of 
discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1999).  “[A] proper Rule 59(e) motion . . . must rely on one of three grounds: 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
2 Even if Shahin had not waived her arguments regarding the August 3rd order, the 
District Court properly concluded that she did not incur any costs prior to November 7, 
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(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) 
the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”  Lazaridis v. 
Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. 
CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Shahin, in her Rule 59(e) 
motion, asked for a complete revocation of all prior decisions and that her case be 
remanded for a jury trial.  However, she did not identify any particular error with respect 
to the District Court’s August 3rd order.  Rather, she generally claimed that the Court’s 
prior rulings violated her constitutional rights.  Because Shahin’s arguments do not state 
valid grounds for relief under Rule 59(e), the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying her motion. 
 Finally, to the extent that Shahin presents arguments in her brief challenging the 
District Court’s original March 7, 2014 order, we decline to review them.  We previously 
decided with finality any arguments pertaining to that order in Shahin’s earlier appeal.  
Our remand was purely limited to a determination of costs.  
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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